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Abstract
In this article we examine Classical Confucian political thinking through the lens of 
paternalism. We situate Confucianism amid contemporary models of paternalism to 
show that Confucianism can be understood as a soft form of paternalism regarding its 
method. Confucianism stresses cultivation of the people by moral exemplars to guide 
the people to act in ways that are in their own best interests. This is in contrast to use of 
law and punishment as a deterrent of unwanted behaviours of the people. We demon-
strate that Confucian paternalism does not advocate for a static top-down structure of 
governance that is incapable of reform, underscoring its non-authoritarian ideal. We 
do this by stressing the vital upward momentum constituted in general cultivation of 
the wider population utilizing li (rituals). The picture that emerges from an examina-
tion of Confucian political thought through the lens of paternalism is what we name 
“exemplary paternalism.”
Keywords
paternalism  – Confucian political philosophy  – political paternalism  – Confucian 
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1 Introduction
In this article, we consider how examining Classical Confucian political think-
ing through the lens of paternalism can offer valuable interpretive and com-
parative insights into the nature of Confucian philosophy. Further, we aim 
to show how such consideration of early Confucian thinking can contribute 
to general discourse on paternalism. This exploration is especially useful be-
cause, we would suggest, the underlying principles of paternalist thinking 
can be identified as a common thread across most of the dominant Classical 
schools of Chinese political thinking.1
Confucianism as a school of thought spans over two thousand years and 
has undergone many transformations. In what follows, we use the term 
“Confucianism” to refer mainly to the philosophy of The Analects of Kongzi 
(Confucius). To a lesser extent we also draw on the writings of two other im-
portant early Confucian thinkers, Mengzi and Xunzi, to support our reading. 
By doing this we do not mean to suggest that there are not important differ-
ences and disagreements between these figures. Where relevant, we highlight 
these. Further, in the following we limit our focus to the early Confucian ideal 
image of political arrangements and societal structures rather than the more 
pragmatic, and often less utopic, theories for application given in certain 
Confucian thinkers. We do not mean, with our assessment, to suggest that this 
ideal form has been fully exhibited in any particular concrete historical periods 
of supposedly Confucian social or political structures.2
Gerald Dworkin defines paternalism as “the interference of a state or an 
individual with another person, against their will, … defended or motivat-
ed by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected 
from harm.”3
Paternalism is unpopular in contemporary discourse, often being identified 
as the hallmark of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Any sign of pater-
nalist activities being undertaken by a government therefore tend to lead to 
1 This present work follows on from our previous research into the “maternalist” principles un-
derlying the Daodejing (a classical Chinese foundational text of the school of thought known 
as Daoism): Sarah Flavel and Brad Hall, “State Maternalism: Rethinking Anarchist Readings 
of the Daodejing,” Dao 19, no. 3 (2020): 353-369.
2 Joseph Chan provides an excellent discussion regarding these different currents of thinking 
in Confucianism and how the two interact; Joseph Chan, Confucian Perfectionism: A Political 
Philosophy for Modern Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014), 1-23.
3 Gerald Dworkin, “Paternalism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edi-
tion), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/paternalism/ 
(accessed August 31st, 2020).
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derogatory claims that they are movements towards a “nanny state” or worse. 
Referring to the association of paternalism with authoritarian regimes, Sarah 
Conly aptly explains that: “Even if we remind ourselves that paternalistic mea-
sures must, by definition, be beneficent in intent, which the Nazis and Khmere 
Rouge obviously were not, it is not much of a comfort.”4
In fact, many would regard the development of human rights and associ-
ated individual freedoms as a long-fought victory over paternalism.5 The birth 
of the notion of the rational individual capable of reasoning and thinking for 
themselves brought with it a distrust of authority. Due to the unpopularity of 
paternalism, the term is not often understood to be a useful diagnostic con-
cept, let alone framed as a positive political and social theory to be supported 
and implemented. As Michael Barnett notes, “more often than not, it [pater-
nalism] is hurled as an accusation and allegation.”6
However, directly equating paternalism with authoritarianism is both ab-
stractly and concretely inaccurate. Paternalist models of social control argu-
ably inform the activity and legislation of all modern states in both the Western 
and Asian contexts. As Christopher Wolfe argues:
Paternalism, from one point of view, is simply unavoidable. It would be 
an illusion to believe that the form and content of the law – all law, in 
liberal regimes as well as others – do not have a powerful influence on the 
lives of many human beings, subtly shaping their attitudes about what a 
good human life is.7
Generally speaking, paternalism is a characteristic function of the legal sys-
tem where we benefit from a wide variety of laws designed to protect us from 
our own potentially harmful behaviors. Paternalist mechanisms can be seen in 
laws that instruct people to wear seatbelts in cars whether they want to or not, 
in those that compel parents to take their children to school, and those that 
prohibit people from carrying guns just because they would like to do so. It can 
also be seen in more indirect forms in the raising of taxes and prices on harm-
ful products such as cigarettes to deter people from buying them. It can also 
of course be seen outside of the legal system in anti-tobacco and anti-drink 
4 Sarah Conly, Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2013), 24.
5 Michael N. Barnett, “Introduction,” in Paternalism Beyond Borders, ed. Michael N. Barnett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 7.
6 Barnett, “Introduction,” 5.
7 Christopher Wolfe, “Liberalism and Paternalism: A Critique of Ronald Dworkin,” The Review 
of Politics 56, no. 4 (Fall 1994): 639.
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driving advertising campaigns funded by the government that seek to influ-
ence people’s perspectives and thereby inform their behaviors. All these pater-
nalist practices are common and even subject to wide approval by populations 
in modern liberal democracies. To suggest that Western governments are sub-
stantively non-paternalist is descriptively inaccurate.
Various recent historical events in the West underscore further need for 
a reappraisal of views on paternalism and its role in legitimate governance. 
Populist movements in the election of Donald Trump and the UK vote on 
Brexit have increasingly underscored the dangers of trusting direct democratic 
mechanisms in deciding what is in the best interests of a nation. These events 
show how easy it is for public opinion to drastically veer away from the insights 
provided by those with relevant expertise in, for example, economic projec-
tion. Globally, the outbreak of Covid-19 has also brought to the foreground the 
benefits of paternalist tools in relation to those governments who enforced 
harsher lockdowns earlier upon their citizens and seemingly appear to have 
had better outcomes in response to the crisis, at least in terms of controlling 
the virus itself to date. Overall, such phenomena lead us to re-think whether 
Eamon de Velera might have been right (at least in spirit) in his famous but 
controversial paternalist claim that: “The majority have no right to do wrong.”8
Paternalism, as an approach to governance, has two closely related under-
lying principles. Firstly, that if people are left to their own devices, they have 
tendencies not to know what is in their own best interests and are therefore 
not likely to act in their own best interests. Secondly, that the state, if properly 
organized, can be in a better position to know what is in the best interest of the 
people and to make certain decisions on their behalf. Classical Confucian po-
litical philosophy holds to both underlying principles of paternalism, making 
paternalism an apt term to use when discussing Confucian ideas of political 
governance. We are not the first to apply paternalism to Confucian thinking. 
However, in existing scholarship there has been a lack of attention paid to the 
variety of definitions and models of paternalism in contemporary literature 
and how these relate to the Confucian model. Such oversight can serve to con-
ceal the unique positive elements of Confucian philosophy and particularly 
those that can enhance Western discourse on paternalism. Further, it can lead 
to the negative connotations of paternalist systems of oversight being trans-
posed onto our understanding of Confucianism, and in so doing, support an 
authoritarian reading.
8 As quoted in John Hutchinson, Nationalism and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2017), 169.
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Our reading and aims in this paper do share some degree of similarity with 
the work of Joseph Chan who describes Confucian political thinking as a form 
of “perfectionism.” Chan outwardly rejects the label of paternalism because of, 
among other things, its authoritarian connotations.9 Whilst we draw on Chan 
to support some elements of our own work, we disagree fundamentally on this 
point about the overall characterization of Confucianism in paternalist terms, 
which has non-trivial consequences. This will be made clear after further ad-
vancement of our argument.
Before going on to dispute such a reading, Sor-hoon Tan notes that “Confu-
cianism has often been treated as an authoritarian philosophy that exalts the 
absolute authority of rulers over subjects, of fathers over sons, and of husbands 
over wives.”10 For example, Shaun O’Dwyer, who discusses Confucianism in a 
framework of paternalism, shows some sympathy for this reading. Referring to 
the philosophy of Mengzi, an early Confucian thinker second in importance 
only to Kongzi himself, O’Dwyer endorses a top-down interpretation of Confu-
cian rulership by suggesting that in Confucianism “There is indeed a good deal 
of tolerance for ‘one way obedience.’”11
To define Confucianism as authoritarian would be an unfair judgment on 
several counts, but especially because Confucian thinkers believe that using 
coercion and force of law as a primary method of control is an inferior method 
of overseeing and even directing the behaviors of the people.12 Kongzi himself 
expressly thinks of legalist frameworks as self-defeating because they fail to 
encourage reliable moral behaviors among the population over time. Instead, 
the attempt to “control” popular behavior is enacted through a long-term sys-
tem of virtue cultivation, in which Confucianism, instead of forcing people 
to behave in a manner deemed best by leaders, encourages the general moral 
cultivation of the people such that they should want to behave in a manner 
that coheres with general social harmony and their own best interests. In this 
sense the Confucian brand of paternalism is designed as a corrective to the 
first principle of paternalist thinking: that if people are left to their own devic-
es they have tendencies not to know what is in their own best interests and are 
therefore not likely to act in their own best interests. The Confucians believe it 
possible that remedial measures can correct this problem.
9  Chan, Confucian Perfectionism, 44.
10  Sor-hoon Tan, “Authoritative Master Kong (Confucius) in An Authoritarian Age,” Dao 9 
(2010): 137.
11 Shaun O’Dwyer, “Epistemic Elitism, Paternalism, and Confucian Democracy,” Dao 14 
(2015): 40-41.
12  Chan, Confucian Perfectionism, 13-14.
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Dworkin’s definition, mentioned above, suggests that paternalism can be 
understood only in terms of outwardly forcing people to act or not act in cer-
tain ways against their will. Confucianism challenges this definition and can be 
understood as a softer form of paternalism in that it promotes exemplary virtu-
ous leadership and moral education of the masses over force and rule by law. 
In the following section of this paper we support a broader and less pejorative 
definition of paternalism, as given by Barnett, that seeks to “[resurrect] the an-
alytical utility of the concept.”13 The definition is better suited to Confucianism 
as it integrates those paternalist activities including positive instances where a 
person, or society in general, is willing to give authority over to those deemed 
more knowledgeable in order that they can make decisions on their behalf. We 
look at some contemporary theories and models that wish to positively utilize 
paternalist methods that do not rely on force, highlighting their similarities 
and differences to the Confucian model.
We then move on to examine Confucianism more closely through the lens 
of paternalism, engaging with and building upon scholars who have undertak-
en projects in this area. We do this in four steps. Firstly, we give a brief overview 
of the historical context of early Confucianism. Secondly, we demonstrate that 
Confucian paternalism is constituted in governance by moral exemplars in line 
with the will of the people and that therefore does not advocate for authoritar-
ian rulership. Thirdly, we contrast Confucianism with another early Chinese 
political philosophy known as legalism, which holds law and punishment to 
be the best deterrent of unwanted behaviors of the people.
Finally, we demonstrate that Confucianism does not advocate for a static 
top-down structure of governance that is incapable of reform, further un-
derscoring its non-authoritarian ideal. We do this by stressing the vital up-
ward momentum involved in general cultivation of the wider population. In 
the Confucian ideal, paternalism is enculturated into the people at all levels 
through exemplary leadership and education in li (rites, rituals, and codes of 
conduct governing social relations). This encourages the development of pa-
ternalist sentiment among the population in general who are expected to take 
on paternal roles towards those in their care. This means that, ideally speak-
ing, the people can gain the skills and moral sentiments necessary to go on to 
be exemplary virtuous leaders themselves. Without this upward movement, 
grounded in moral education, the ability to sustain exemplary moral gover-
nance would not be possible. The aim of Confucianism is to create morally 
cultivated dynamic individuals who will eventually have the capacity to govern 
and transform culture and society so that stability of the state and the welfare 
13  Barnett, “Introduction,” 5.
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of the people is secured through changing social, cultural, political and geo-
graphical climates. In theory at least, such participation in the moral future of 
society is to be made available to all citizens.
The picture that emerges from an examination of Confucian political 
thought through the lens of paternalism is what we name “exemplary pater-
nalism.” This an image of the relationship between the ruler and subjects (or 
state and its people) that attempts a balance between top-down oversight 
and emphasis on cultivation of political life from the bottom up. In this sense 
Confucianism cannot be said to overemphasize the position of the leader at 
the expense of the integrity of and regard for their subjects below or that it 
excludes citizens from active participation.
In concluding we argue that not only is it appropriate to define Confucianism 
as a form of paternalism but that the unique aspects of Confucian exemplary 
paternalism make it able to contribute towards the debate as to definition. This 
further allows for Confucianism to contribute towards projects that seek to uti-
lize paternalism in addressing issues of contemporary politics in positive ways 
that are not simply dismissed as excessively authoritarian.
2 Defining Paternalism
Determining the boundaries of “paternalism” is a contested issue. At what 
point can we claim particular state actions to be paternalistic (and to what ex-
tent are we willing to give up our rights and freedoms in order to allow for such 
practices)? Danny Scoccia argues, it is “a common mistake … to define ‘pater-
nalism’ in a way that limits the means to coercive ones.”14 Dworkin extrapo-
lates his definition of paternalism by saying that at the very least it “involves 
some kind of limitation on the freedom or autonomy of some agent and it does 
so for a particular class of reasons.”15 When such laws and rules are
… justified solely on the grounds that the person affected would be better 
off, or would be less harmed, as a result of the rule, policy, etc., and the 
person in question would prefer not to be treated this way, we have an 
instance of paternalism.16
14  Danny Scoccia, “In Defense of Hard Paternalism,” Law and Philosophy 27, no. 4 (July 
2008): 353.
15  Dworkin, “Paternalism.”
16  Ibid.
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Dworkin’s definition certainly implies that for any activity to qualify as pa-
ternalist it must be coercive, forceful and against the will of the person being 
interfered with. Such definitions do not allow for more subtle instances of pa-
ternalism where decisions are made for others (with or without their knowl-
edge) yet perhaps with their full or implicit support. Dworkin’s approach in 
some sense therefore assumes that those ruled by paternalist governance 
would always rather not be treated this way or that to disagree with what one 
is asked to do is integral to how we define a paternalist action. Thus, we find 
such a definition problematically pejorative.
When paternalism is understood this way, its sub-definitions likewise are 
produced in this problematic framework. For example, Dworkin outlines a dis-
tinction between softer and harder forms of paternalism, claiming that soft 
paternalism allows for intervention only in cases where someone is not fully 
aware of the nature and consequences of their actions (and is therefore not 
understood to be acting freely).17 In contrast, hard paternalism allows for inter-
vention even against voluntary and fully informed actions when such actions 
are deemed not in the person’s best interest. An obvious example would be 
that under hard paternalism we can stop a person drinking poison, even if they 
are doing so fully aware of the consequences. Soft paternalism would require 
that they are somehow unaware or incapacitated in their decision making.
We therefore see that the distinction between hard and soft tends to be 
made solely on the grounds of difference in views as to when it is acceptable 
to force someone against their will to change their behavior. Conversely, the 
distinction can be understood in terms of how much freedom is given to indi-
viduals to make their own decisions.
We describe Confucian paternalism as soft, but we do not mean it in the 
sense above. The distinction we make between a hard and soft paternalism 
is instead in reference to method. Confucianism is a soft form of paternalism 
but not in relation to the amount of freedom it affords citizens. The distinc-
tion to be made is between the method of hard paternalism in which force of 
law is seen as the most efficacious way of getting the people to behave in ways 
conducive to their own best interests and the interests of the state, and the 
alternative method of soft paternalism in which virtuous leadership and moral 
cultivation of the people are understood to be the most efficacious tools. In 
other words, soft paternalism may aim at the same results but with an entirely 
different methodology. This is how the terms hard and soft can more meaning-
fully be used when discussing early Chinese paternalism, in which the issue of 
promoting maximal individual freedom is less of a central concern.
17  Ibid.
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A broader definition of paternalism is needed to incorporate the soft pater-
nalism of Confucianism. Barnett gives an alternate definition of paternalism 
to that of Dworkin:
Paternalism is the attempt by one actor to substitute his judgment for 
another’s on the grounds that it is in the latter’s best interests or welfare.18
As Barnett explains, by focusing on the substitution of judgment over use of 
force, this alternative definition is thus able to incorporate those paternalist 
activities that are not straightforwardly framed in terms of one actor forcing 
another actor to do something they would otherwise not do or explicitly do 
not want to do (or stopping them from doing something). Such activities occur
… when institutions set an agenda that removes some possibilities from 
the menu of choice and from discussion. It occurs when actors occupy 
roles that give them the authority and duty to act in someone else’s best 
interests.19
An example might be the content of a national curriculum for students 
being determined by a government body. Although backed by law and having 
mechanisms for people to voice their disagreement, most are happy to hand 
authority over to professionals who will make these decisions that may have 
significant impacts on their children’s education and the shape of future so-
ciety. Just because people agree on this system, in which one allows for judg-
ment to be made on their behalf, does not mean it is not a paternalist gesture. 
Children and their parents, broadly speaking, are not directly empowered to 
make choices regarding the content of their schooling. The example of educa-
tion is an apt one as universal education (including moral education) is a key 
element of cultivating the people in early Confucianism.20
There are, in fact, plenty of examples of people in liberal democracies rec-
ognizing their inability to make a sound judgment and going on to give up cer-
tain rights and abilities to make certain choices and perform certain actions, 
with a preference that someone else should make judgement in their place. 
This can be seen in people admitting themselves to psychiatric institutions, or 
drug rehabilitation clinics, when they fear that they cannot trust themselves. It 
can also be seen outside of health institutions in examples such as compulsive 
18  Barnett, “Introduction,” 13.
19  Ibid.
20  Mencius, trans. D.C. Lau (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press 2003), 3A4, 115.
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gamblers voluntarily signing up to blacklists that bar them from entering casi-
nos under pain of possible penalty.21 These people acknowledge that they are 
not inclined to take actions in their own best interest and therefore request 
a degree of control over their own future activities by an external party. The 
point being that paternalism does not necessarily entail discord between those 
that make decisions and those on whose behalf they are deciding. This is espe-
cially important in the case of a Confucian model of governance, that would 
expressly want to avoid a clash between the leader and the people despite the 
overall acceptance that the leadership can and should usually be in such a po-
sition of decisive authority.
One of the further advantages of a definition that focuses on substitution 
of judgment is that it helps to remove the inherently negative authoritarian 
connotations from the concept. As such, the definition allows for a more sober 
analysis that does not immediately equate Confucianism with authoritarian-
ism and thus tend toward the merely pejorative.
To argue for a reading of Confucianism as non-authoritarian, Tan wishes to 
downplay its paternalist elements:
In coercing others for their own good, paternalism is authoritarian…. Even 
if one concedes that there is a tendency to paternalism in Confucianism, 
one could still maintain that paternalism could not be pushed too far on 
Confucian grounds because its concern is moral transformation which 
could not be brought about by force alone.22
Likewise, Chan wishes to avoid using the term to understand Confucianism 
saying that paternalism “is commonly associated with the use of coercion 
by the state to promote the good of its citizens.”23 However, the negation of 
Confucianism as a paternalism is made here on the basis that paternalism is 
authoritarian. This is in line with the more limited definitions of paternalism 
such as those of Dworkin. In fact, Tan can here be seen to be using a notion 
of soft paternalism along the lines that soft paternalism avoids interfering in 
personal freedoms as far as possible rather than it being softer in method. This 
is further highlighted when she goes on to say that in Confucianism:
21  Robert Ladouceur et al., “Responsible gambling: a synthesis of the empirical evidence,” 
Addiction Research and Theory 25, no. 3 (2017): 229-230.
22  Tan, “Authoritative Master Kong,” 141.
23  Chan, Confucian Perfectionism, 44.
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Force could at best be used as a temporary measure, and only if there is 
reason in each specific case to believe it would contribute to an apprecia-
tion of the good aimed at, and eventually voluntary compliance would 
render force unnecessary.24
Whilst we do not disagree that this is indeed a part of Confucian paternal-
ism, we argue that this is only a small aspect of it. By aligning paternalism 
with authoritarianism, Tan is forced to downplay the paternalist aspects of 
Confucianism. This opens her argument up to criticism that it does not hon-
estly represent these aspects of Confucian political philosophy. However, if we 
understand paternalism in the broader sense of substitution of judgment then 
the paternalist tendencies of Confucianism can be brought to the foreground 
and even celebrated (even when being critiqued). The strength of paternalist 
methods of governance that do not rely solely on force and coercion are made 
clearer when we recognize them as such and accept their background views as 
to the validity of a paternalist approach.
There are contemporary definitions and forms of paternalism that attempt 
to take account of the fact that paternalism can present itself in different ways 
using methods other than force of law and thus can be referred to as soft in the 
sense that we wish to use the term. For example, positive (as opposed to nega-
tive) paternalism focuses on providing incentives for people to make better 
choices such as subsidies for using leisure centers to encourage sporting activi-
ties to improve health.25 What is important to highlight here is that such meth-
ods not only encourage people to make better choices but also allow people to 
be actively involved in their own betterment. In a not dissimilar way, Confucian 
paternalism requires that the people be engaged in their own cultivation.
Another wave of new thinking that seeks to demonstrate how paternalism 
can be used positively in free democratic societies was brought to the fore-
ground in the book Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and 
Happiness by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler.26 This is known as liberal pa-
ternalism. Rather than removing choices from people by force or by increasing 
the cost of making certain decisions (raising the price of cigarettes for exam-
ple), they suggest that people can be nudged into making the better choices 
by changing how those choices are presented. For example, by placing healthy 
24  Ibid.
25  Ryan J. Thomas, “In Defense of Journalistic Paternalism,” Journal of Media Ethics 31, no. 2 
(2016): 9.
26  Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth 
and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press 2009).
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food at the front in a cafeteria and by shining a light onto it, people are encour-
aged to make the healthy choice. Changing opt in to opt out systems for pen-
sions and organ donation can increase uptake.27 By altering the architecture of 
choice through which people make their decisions people can be encouraged 
to make better choices.
Thaler and Sunstein define a nudge as “any aspect of the choice architec-
ture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any 
options or significantly changing their economic incentive.”28 Some criticize 
nudging for harnessing cognitive biases in people’s decision making. For exam-
ple, opt out systems cash in on the cognitive bias to not spend effort to change 
something that is already in place. It is also criticized for not being transparent 
and for manipulating people without their knowledge.29
Liberal paternalism can also be criticized on the grounds that it is not suf-
ficiently paternalist to warrant the name. Christopher Snowdon argues that:
The most damning criticism of the nudge project is not that it is illiberal, 
but that it is insubstantial in the context of the big issues of government. 
If one strips out all of the nudges that are not paternalistic [they treat the 
individual as fully competent decision makers or do not directly benefit 
the individual], not libertarian and not trivial, there is little left of the 
libertarian paternalist agenda. It is precisely because Thaler and Sunstein 
are reluctant to use state coercion that the implications of nudge theory 
for public policy are so limited.30
By trying to retain the freedom of the individual, liberal paternalism becomes 
so liberal that it does not live up to the name paternalism anymore, at least not 
in regard to a system of governance. In both positive and liberal paternalism, 
the focus on incentive generally removes the aspect of deterrent. More severe 
interventionist measures enforced by law are necessary to deal with the more 
difficult situations.
Having briefly outlined some of the issues surrounding definition, we are 
now in a position to more closely examine Confucianism as a form of pater-
nalism under the broad definition given by Barnett that has a focus on the 
substitution of judgment. As will be explained in more detail in the following 
27 Dworkin, “Paternalism.”
28 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 6.
29 Dworkin, “Paternalism.”
30 Christopher Snowden, Killjoys: A Critique of Paternalism (London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs 2017), 24.
232 Flavel and Hall
Culture and Dialogue 8 (2020) 220-250
section, Confucianism shares some similarities with positive and liberal pater-
nalism in that it seeks to guide and encourage rather than force one to act or 
not act. However, Confucianism does not hold the autonomy of the individual 
to be of the highest value and therefore it recommends a much more radical 
method of inculcating the people into a moral outlook that molds them into 
virtuous citizens. By doing this, Confucianism retains a power of deterrence in 
that the people are unwilling to commit acts that are not morally upstanding 
due to a sense of shame. It does not make use of defects in the decision mak-
ing of people but rather appeals to their better nature and their ability to make 
better judgment. Furthermore, Confucianism is transparent about its paternal-
ism regarding its methods of changing the people’s behavior through moral 
cultivation. It is a soft form of paternalism but one that is far more resilient to 
the criticisms given above, one we term “exemplary paternalism.”
3 Confucian Exemplary Paternalism
In some recent scholarship, the term “paternalism” has been used when discuss-
ing classical Confucian political philosophy. Gregory Fairbrother goes so far as 
to suggest that “each Chinese regime since the late imperial period has claimed 
legitimacy on the basis of its paternalistic character.”31 Whilst overstated and 
overlooking the strong influence from other schools of thought, Fairbrother 
identifies the roots of this paternalism in classical Confucian thought when 
he says that “Paternalism is not completely synonymous with Confucianism, 
but it does have its primary basis in the classical Confucian works of Confucius 
himself, Mencius and Xunzi.”32 These prominent Confucian thinkers lived in 
the politically fragile times known as the Spring and Autumn and Warring 
States periods.
Imperial China begins with the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE). The founding 
of the Qin dynasty ended the Spring and Autumn and Warring States pe-
riods (722-221 BCE). This was a time of great political upheaval and change 
that saw the demise of the feudalistic hierarchy of the former Zhou dynasty 
(1122-221 BCE) and the rise of independent feudal states. It had been common 
practice for the Zhou kings to enfeoff their relatives and afford them some 
power, but these familial bonds were now weakening. Contractual and ritual 
31  Gregory P. Fairbrother, “The Chinese Paternalistic State and Moral Education,” in 
Citizenship Education in China: Preparing Citizens for the “Chinese Century,” ed. Kerry J. 
Kennedy, Gregory P. Fairbrother, and Zhao Zhenzhou (London: Routledge, 2014), 13.
32  Fairbrother, “The Chinese Paternalistic State,” 14.
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associations between rulers and ruled that had ensured the stability of their re-
lationship were becoming unstable. Infighting within states and war between 
newly independent states was made inevitable by population growth and lim-
ited resources.33 In the philosophical language of the time, the Way (Dao) does 
not prevail in the world.
The turmoil of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods gave rise 
to many political issues and saw a flourishing of diverse political philosophies. 
Based on the experience of political and cultural upheaval during this time a 
number of different schools presented themselves as offering alternative an-
swers to the question of how to cohere society and the best models of political 
and moral oversight. For this reason, the era is often typified as the Hundred 
Schools period of Classical Chinese philosophy.34
Generally speaking, the primary concerns across the varying philosophies 
of the time can be subsumed under the broader question of how to return 
stability and harmony to the political and social landscape. As Tongdong Bai 
explains “when the old political structure no longer has relevance to the new 
reality, … a new regime is desperately needed.”35 Although only posthumously 
gaining his position at the center of Chinese philosophy, this is the historical 
context in which the ideas of the Classical thinker Kongzi were established and 
began to gain traction.
A key feature of a Confucian paternalist framework is rule by moral 
exemplars.36 Kongzi makes no proposal to do away with hierarchical struc-
tures in which a single authority sits at the top with governors and ministers 
of lesser authority surrounding him, overseeing the general populace below.
Chapter 1.2 of the Analects (a collection primarily of the teachings of Kongzi, 
who wrote nothing down himself, and some other Confucian thinkers) reads:
It is a rare thing for someone who is filial to his parents and respectful 
to his older brothers to defy superiors to be keen on initiating rebellion. 
Exemplary persons concentrate their efforts on the root, for the root hav-
ing taken hold, the Way will grow therefrom. Being filial to one’s parents 
and being respectful to one’s older brothers is the root of humanity!37
33  Tongdong Bai, China: The Political Philosophy of the Middle Kingdom (London: Zed 
Books), 17-18.
34  Karyn N. Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2008), 3.
35  Bai, China, 21.
36 Fairbrother, “The Chinese Paternalistic State,” 18.
37 Quoted in Bai, China 36.
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Bai notes that this passage “suggests that communal and political relations 
are analogous to and should be modelled on familial relations.”38 Roger Ames 
and Henry Rosemont explain that the Confucian worldview promotes the fam-
ily as “the pervasive model of order.”39
In the West, paternalism utilizes a metaphor of the family, in which the 
parents are more knowledgeable and experienced than their children and 
need to make decisions on their behalf for their protection and betterment. 
In Confucianism, however, (and present in much early Chinese thinking), this 
can be understood to have literal connotations. Jiwei Ci claims that, “In a sense, 
the analogy is more metaphorical than literal, but it almost can be taken liter-
ally through the influence of ideology, in which the ruler is the father of his 
subjects.”40 With the rulers understood as the fathers and mothers and the 
people their children, paternalism is an attractive framework through which 
to study Confucianism. Confucian leaders are literally meant to be wiser in 
terms of the widest interests of the population.
However, the role in the family that you inhabit is determined by circum-
stance. Doh Chull Shin tells us that in politics, the early Confucians were ad-
vocating for a “merit-based system [that] enabled the most talented to rise to 
the highest offices, replacing the rule by hereditary aristocracy.”41 Such a hi-
erarchy is not intended to imply aristocratic elitism and Confucius is keen to 
promote those who are deserving of promotion based on worthiness rather 
than heredity.
For Kongzi, the legitimacy of such a rule is not to be found in birthright. It is 
not God-given. Furthermore, authority is not to be assumed forcefully through 
military might. In the ideal vision, political legitimacy rests solely in leadership 
that embodies the virtue of ren (benevolence/humanness) as an overarching 
characteristic of virtuous leadership that contains within it numerous other 
underlying virtues. Shin describes this as “a form of benevolent paternalism” 
and a “paternalistic meritocracy.”42
38  Ibid.
39  Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., “Introduction,” in The Analects of Confucius: 
A Philosophical Translation, trans. Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (New York: 
Ballantine Books 1998), 58.
40 Jiwei Ci, “The Confucian Relational Concept of the Person and Its Modern Predicament,” 
in Personhood and Healthcare, eds. David C. Thomasma, David N. Weisstub, and Christian 
Herve (Dordrecht: Kluwer 2001), 155.
41 Doh Chull Shin, Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), 114.
42  Shin, Confucianism and Democratization, 146 and 137.
235Exemplary Paternalism
Culture and Dialogue 8 (2020) 220-250
Regarding who these rulers should be, Kongzi appropriated the term junzi, 
which was a title literally meaning a lord/prince’s son. Working to instill mo-
rality as the legitimacy for rulership, Kongzi imbues the term with “aesthetic, 
moral, and spiritual characteristics.”43 The junzi are those who have travelled 
far along the path of moral cultivation, who work tirelessly to realize ren and 
to gather knowledge in themselves and their actions, and who truly feel love 
towards the people. They are knowledgeable and learned in history, tradition, 
ritual, and codes of conduct. Geir Sigurdsson succinctly describes a junzi as 
“an exemplary person, whose experience and wisdom, communicability and 
openness, social sense and acquired personal charisma provide him or her 
with the ability to transform the immediate social environment.”44 They serve 
as role models to the people. The junzi are those competent enough to govern. 
Above even the junzi are the sages. Kongzi tells us that the junzi stand in awe 
of the words of the sage.45 Kongzi says, “How majestic they were – Yao and 
Shun reigned over the world but did not rule it.”46 By claiming that these real 
or imagined sage rulers reigned but did not rule, Kongzi is highlighting their 
exemplary moral leadership that did not require oppressive force.
As benevolent rulers, the junzi and the sages are responsible for oversee-
ing the “economic prosperity” and “physical security” of the people.47 O’Dwyer 
further expands on this exemplary leadership by highlighting the “epistemic 
elitism and paternalism that is central to the early Confucian thought.”48 
Epistemic elitism is a part of Confucian paternalism constituted by such mor-
ally and intellectually elite governors making decisions deemed to be in the 
best interest of the people without need to divulge information to the people 
about how those decisions are made. Although the ruler is humble and willing 
to consult the people to make an informed decision, this decision making is 
beyond the realm of the ordinary people. Kongzi says, “when the way prevails 
in the world, the common people do not debate affairs of state.”49
Both Shin and O’Dwyer use a key passage from the Mencius where he looks 
to an example from the past to argue for a division of labor. Those of superior 
43  Ames and Rosemont, “Introduction,” 60-61.
44  Geir Sigurdsson, “Confucian Philosophy as a Universal Approach to Integrated Living: 
A Contemporary Interpretation,” in Differences in Identity in Philosophy and Religion: A 
Cross-Cultural Approach, ed. Sarah Flavel and Russell Re Manning (London: Bloomsbury 
2020), 32.
45  The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, trans. Roger T. Ames and Henry 
Rosemont, Jr. (New York: Ballantine Books 1998), 16:8, 198.
46  The Analects of Confucius, 8:18, 124.
47  Shin, Confucianism and Democratization, 115.
48 O’Dwyer, “Epistemic Elitism,” 51.
49  The Analects of Confucius, 16:2, 197.
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knowledge and skill perform the greater acts on behalf of the populace so that 
they may perform the smaller duties. In passage 3A4 Mengzi says:
If everyone must make everything he uses, the Empire will be led upon 
a path of incessant toil. Hence it is said, ‘there are those who use their 
minds and there are those who use their muscles. The former rule; the 
latter are ruled. Those who rule are supported by those who are ruled.’
…
In the time of Yao, the Empire was not yet settled. The Flood still raged 
unchecked, inundating the Empire; plants grew thickly; birds and beasts 
multiplied; the five grains did not ripen; birds and beasts encroached 
upon men, and their trail criss-crossed even the Central Kingdoms. The 
lot fell on Yao to worry about this situation. He raised Shun to a position 
of authority to deal with it. Shun put Yi in charge of fire. Yi ringed off the 
mountains and valleys and set them alight, and the birds and beasts went 
into hiding. Yu dredged the Nine Rivers, cleared the courses of the Chi [Ji] 
and the T’a [Ta] to channel the water into the sea, deepened the beds of 
the Ju [Ru] and the Han, and raised the dykes of the Huai and the Ssu [Si] 
to empty them into the river. Only then were the people of the Central 
Kingdoms able to find food for themselves.50
This passage makes clear that there is a distinction between ruler and ruled 
that is based upon ability and wisdom. Without the wisdom and actions of the 
virtuous rulers, the people in the story would likely live harsh and difficult lives. 
Mengzi tells us that if everyone only looks after themselves, then people will 
not be able to enact large scale projects that will have great benefit for all the 
people. The people are key to enacting these projects, but they are not knowl-
edgeable or virtuous enough to design them in the interests of others. Kongzi 
says that “The common people can be induced to travel along the way, but they 
cannot be induced to realize it.”51 Similarly, Mengzi says that “The multitude 
can be said never to understand what they practice, to notice what they repeat-
edly do, or to be aware of the path they follow all their lives.”52 Xunzi is perhaps 
more optimistic in this regard, holding the view that anyone has the potential 
to become a sage.53
50  Mencius, 3A4, 115.
51  The Analects of Confucius, 8:9, 122.
52  Mencius, 7A5, 289.
53  Xunzi: Basic Writings, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press), 170.
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In the passage from the Mengzi it is also seen that the ruler grants authority 
to those deemed able to take on great responsibility, i.e. based on merit. This 
is how the ruler can ensure the aptitude of those in the government and the 
government’s success. Initially, Yao gives authority to Shun. As the legend goes, 
Yao would go on to cede the Empire to Shun to whom he was unrelated.54 Shun 
would go on to become a legendary sage ruler himself.
Kongzi uses a beautiful analogy to describe a true ruler and the lofty and au-
thoritative position they hold that gives them almost cosmological significance:
Governing with excellence can be compared to being the North Star: 
The North Star dwells in its place, and the multitude of stars pay trib-
ute to it.55
Respecting the leaders and being beneficiaries of their virtuous rule, the 
people are happy to hand judgment over to their paternal overseers, the junzi 
and sages, regarding complex political and societal issues. Trusting in the 
government, they have no need to discuss affairs of the state themselves. The 
Confucian ideal is not an image of an authoritarian regime. The people do 
not complain but instead reap the benefits, feeling love towards the ruler who 
loves them in return. This is one aspect of Confucian exemplary paternalism.
4 Legalism and Hard Paternalism
Shin notes that Kongzi and his followers denounced the “exploitive practices 
of the military and purely legalistic forms of government, both of which were 
commonplace during his time.”56 In the Confucian model, law takes second-
ary importance.57 Kongzi does not think that penal law is sufficiently able to 
procure a stable society that will be able to survive into the future. Kongzi says:
Lead the people with administrative injunctions (zheng) and keep them 
orderly with penal law (xing), and they will avoid punishments but will 
be without a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence (de) and keep 
54  Bai, China, 17.
55  The Analects of Confucius, 2:1, 76.
56  Shin, Confucianism and Democratization, 107.
57 Fairbrother, “The Chinese Paternalistic State,” 18.
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them orderly through observing ritual propriety (li) and they will develop 
a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves.58
Li is an indispensable part of ren rulership, which will be explored in more de-
tail in the following section. However, this passage shows that Kongzi is clear 
about the view that the people need to feel that a wrong action is immoral, not 
only that it leads to punishment if caught. The stability of society rests on the 
ideal that people will try to make the better decision in every circumstance (or 
at least more often than not), not only when they feel they are being watched. 
In contrast to positive and liberal paternalism that do not have strong deter-
rents in their system and methods, Shin tells us that Confucians “depend on 
their [the people’s] aversion to losing face and being shamed as an effective 
deterrent to crime.”59 This helps to build stable relationships in which people 
are honest, make good on their word and act through compassion.
The model that Kongzi offers contrasts with those thinkers (though com-
ing after Kongzi himself) who have been identified as Legalists. These thinkers 
have a far more negative view than the Confucians of the moral capacities of 
people, of leaders, and on morality itself. The earliest political thinker to be 
categorized as a Legalist, Lord Shang (d. 338 BCE), believes that the basic dis-
position of people is that they covet wealth and fame and are afraid of punish-
ments. When this is understood, the ruler can manipulate the people through 
rewards and punishment to act in ways that are for the greater good for them-
selves and others. Through the possibility of achieving rank and wealth, people 
will undertake the occupations that the state requires (in this case agriculture 
and military). They will follow and enforce the laws that the ruler initiates. 
Through fear of severe punishment, the people will not dare transgress the 
laws or pursue ends that are not sanctioned. However, we would argue that 
Lord Shang is not simply wishing to create a strong state with no care for the 
individuals that populate it. As Yuri Pines argues, in the thought of Lord Shang, 
“The people are simply unaware of what is to their ultimate benefit, so they are 
unable to maintain proper rule without active government intervention” and 
“Oppressive measures are needed simply to prevent the people from harming 
their own best interests.”60 Lord Shang says that:
58  The Analects of Confucius, 2:3, 76.
59  Shin, Confucianism and Democratization, 117.
60  Yuri Pines, “Legalism in Chinese Philosophy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese 
-legalism/ (accessed August 31st, 2020).
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They [the sages] set up law officers and government officials to be the 
authority, in order to guide them [the people]; and they knew that if 
the ten thousands of people all knew what to avoid and what to strive 
for, they would avoid misfortune and strive for happiness, and so restrain 
themselves.61
Although it may not be the case that all thinkers identified as Legalists hold to 
the principle of caring for and working in the best interests of the people, Lord 
Shang shows that Legalism is not incapable of having such principles.
It is interesting to note a similarity here between legalism and liberal pa-
ternalism. Although the two in many senses could not be further apart, both 
attempt to use the negative aspects of people’s behaviors as tools to get them to 
act in certain ways. Confucianism, on the other hand, does not sanction such 
cynical methods.
This is the fundamental disagreement between Legalist and Confucian 
thinkers. The Legalists think that the majority of people are mostly selfish and 
cannot be cultivated. They must be brought in line through threat of punish-
ment and incentive of reward. For Lord Shang, “the basis of the people is the 
law.”62 He says: “if the basis is not solid, then people are like flying birds or like 
animals. Who can regulate these?”63 In this view, people who are allowed to 
base their decisions and actions on benevolence and virtue (most likely in-
sincerely and for selfish reasons) are unpredictable and cannot be governed. 
The Confucians believe that people are capable of moral cultivation and can 
only be brought in line in a stable manner through adherence to higher moral 
principles, with law taking secondary importance. This is the case even where 
Confucian thinkers disagree as to what extent law and punishment should be 
enforced and used as a deterrent. Xunzi holds the stronger view in this regard, 
which does share some similarity with Legalist thinking.64
Kongzi would agree with Legalist thinkers that to perform acts of “benevo-
lence” only for the benefit of oneself is not acceptable and recognizes that this 
is a problem endemic to the political institutions and the wider society. Kongzi 
says that it is “a disgrace to be wealthy and of noble rank when it [the way] does 
not [prevail in the state].”65 Sincerity in virtue and action, which the Legalists 
61  The Book of Lord Shang: ‘Shang Yang,’ trans. J.J.L. Duyvendak (Ware: Wordsworth 1998), 242.
62 Ibid., 214.
63  Ibid.
64 For a discussion on the relationship between the use of law and virtue in the thought of 
Xunzi in comparison to the thought of Legalist thinker Han Fei, see Eirik Lang Harris, 
“The Role of Virtue in Xunzi’s Political Philosophy,” Dao 12, no. 1 (2013): 93-110.
65  The Analects of Confucius, 8:13, 123.
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think is unlikely to be achieved by most, is the cornerstone of Confucian phi-
losophy. Sincere moral and emotional sentiment towards those around you is 
paramount for a harmonious society.
Legalism can be described as a hard paternalism. The state is able to inter-
fere in all aspects of people’s lives and to forcefully bring them in line against 
their will. Legalism actively seeks to block the moral cultivation of the people. 
On the Legalist view, this is how peace and stability are to be found, creating 
a strong state militarily and agriculturally so that it benefits all the people. In 
comparison, Confucianism can be seen to be a soft paternalism but not simply 
in regard to the levels at which it sees intervention as justified. Confucianism 
is not arguing that Legalism is right in spirit only too brutal in its implementa-
tion. It fundamentally disagrees with its political model.
Nor does Confucianism simply offer rank and wealth as reward. Preceding 
the previous quote, Kongzi says, “It is a disgrace to remain poor and without 
rank when the way prevails in the state.”66 This is because having authority 
of wealth and office in a benevolent government affords you more ability to 
help others and to further cultivate yourself through virtuous acts. The reward 
is in virtue itself, in the learning and cultivation, in the betterment of society. 
This reward can be earned without achieving high office. This method of gov-
ernance that uses shame as a deterrent and virtue as an incentive is a soft form 
of paternalism but, as will now be seen as we move to explore the bottom-up 
political cultivation of the people, it is far-reaching and encompassing.
5 The Vital Upward Movement of Exemplary Paternalism
The unique strength of Confucian exemplary paternalism is in its upward 
momentum. Whilst the cultivation of the people is guided from above, it is 
informed by the moral sentiments of those below and asks the people to en-
gage in their own betterment, even if in many cases this will be minimal. The 
system of moral cultivation can only exist if the people participate and serve 
in its larger body. The system gives birth to those virtuous enough to rule in the 
future. This is the only way to ensure lasting ren leadership in a society.
Confucianism makes no apology for the assumption (arguably at the heart 
of all paternalisms) that the common people are not automatically, simply by 
right of birth, sufficiently cultivated or knowledgeable enough to make the big-
ger society-wide decisions that will truly be to their benefit and the benefit 
of all. However, it is important to note that this is not a negative judgment on 
66  Ibid., 8:13, 123.
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human nature (xing) in general. Kongzi allows for the possibility of universal 
education as he believes anyone can participate meaningfully in moral culti-
vation, even if most are not capable of becoming a junzi or sage. Mengzi has 
a view that human nature is inherently good. All people have the capacity to 
improve themselves through reflection and cultivation. It is just the case that 
in reality most people do not.67
Xunzi takes an opposing view to Mengzi and does not regard human nature 
to be inherently good. However, Xunzi still recognizes that “The [ junzi] is by 
birth no different from any other man; it is just that he is good at making use of 
things.”68 This echoes a passage from The Analects:
The Master said: ‘Human beings are similar in their natural tendencies 
(xing), but vary greatly by virtue of their habits.’69
As mentioned earlier, an important part of ren rulership is li. Li is a key tool 
in the cultivation of the people. It has a broad scope of meaning. It can refer 
to rituals and ceremonies, codes of conduct in society, and the concrete in-
stantiation of those codes in daily life.70 In the Analects, some of the rituals 
predominantly discussed include “ceremonies of ancestor worship, the burial 
of parents, and the rules governing respectful and appropriate behavior be-
tween parents and children.”71 Xunzi tells us that li reinforce the distinctions 
between people of different roles and social standing that are to be observed 
within the hierarchy of society and the family.72
Li are the outward manifestations of what are understood to be our internal 
moral sentiments.73,74 Respect shown to one’s parents, care and love shown 
to one’s children, these are manifestations of compassion that have been in-
scribed in the li by exemplary rulers of the past. On their own, li are empty 
67  Paul R. Goldin, “Xunzi,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/xunzi/#HumaNatuXing (accessed 
August 31st, 2020).
68  Xunzi, 16.
69  The Analects of Confucius, 17:4, 203.
70  Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 25.
71 David Wong, “Chinese Ethics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 
Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/
ethics-chinese/ (accessed August 31st, 2020).
72  Xunzi, 94.
73  Bai, China, 31.
74 Xunzi disagrees with this and views li more as artificial constructions of the sages that 
serve to rectify the harmful desires of the people. However, even Xunzi recognizes the 
natural feelings of joy and sorrow that underpin rituals. See Xunzi, 105-106.
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gestures. When accompanied by the appropriate moral sentiment they are 
moral acts that allow for a person to grow in virtue and knowledge. Sigurdsson 
explains the li “function as pedagogical forms of behavior and gestures that 
entail both the interpersonal respect necessary for successful associated living 
and facilitating growth and development in the individual.”75 By adhering to 
the li, people are learning and practicing virtuous behavior.
It is only those who truly understand the li and their relationship to virtue 
that can themselves initiate new practices or change existing li. If the li are 
controlled and altered by those who do not understand them (and therefore 
do not truly understand human moral sentiments), society will crumble.76 For 
Kongzi, the one who truly understands ren and li will be able to govern the 
people with ease.77
It is the family that Kongzi sees as the arena in which to cultivate the root 
of ren in order that it may become ubiquitous. The li are implemented and 
controlled from above, yet as manifestations of innate moral sentiments, they 
are grown from the bottom. The rulers are understood as the fathers and moth-
ers of the people, caring for their children and helping them to practice the 
virtues that underpin li and to blossom within the ritualized manifestations of 
those virtues.
For the early Confucians there is a stress on the virtue of xiao (filial piety). 
Filial piety is shown in respect and loyalty to one’s elder siblings, parents, el-
ders, and superiors. The junzi, having long cultivated xiao, will show respect 
and loyalty to the ruler. Even the sage ruler shows great respect and loyalty to 
his ancestors and the rulers of the past.78 Within exemplary paternalism there 
is a continuous respect and loyalty paid upwards via each station from those at 
the bottom of the hierarchy to those at the very top and beyond. This upward 
looking respect is also returned with care and love to those below. The relation-
ship is reciprocal but not equal.
Despite the general hierarchical nature of this structure, loyalty to one’s 
elders and superiors cannot be understood as an unquestionable allegiance. 
This is a misunderstanding of Confucian paternalism as straightforwardly top-
down and authoritarian. Li, having been created over many years by sage rulers 
who understand them cannot be changed lightly. This is also the case within 
the family. Kongzi says, “A person who for three years refrains from reforming 
75 Sigurdsson, “Confucian Philosophy,” 22.
76  The Analects of Confucius, 16:2, 196-197.
77 Ibid., 3:11, 85.
78 Ames and Rosemont, “Introduction,” 64.
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the ways of his late father can be called a filial son.”79 But reform here is still pos-
sible and even expected. A child may remonstrate softly with their parents.80 
Tan highlights that Kongzi “not only did not advocate unquestioning obedi-
ence to those in authority, but actually considered it very dangerous for rulers 
to desire and enjoy unquestioning obedience.”81 Tan points to chapter 13:15 of 
the Analects in which Kongzi is asked if there is any one saying that can ruin a 
state to which he replies:
… there is a saying, ‘I find little pleasure in ruling, save that no one will 
take exception to what I say.’ If what one has to say is efficacious and no 
one takes exception, fine indeed. But if what one has to say is not effica-
cious and no one takes exception, is this not close to a saying ruining 
a state?82
The responsibility of the moral development of individuals is not necessarily 
solely in the hands of the state. Li is given to the people so that they can use it 
to cultivate themselves and others around them. Sometimes this means inferi-
ors remonstrating and reforming their elders.
A conversation is given in the Analects:
The Governor of She in conversation with Confucius said, ‘In our vil-
lage there is someone called “True Person.” When his father took a sheep 
on the sly, he reported him to the authorities.’ Confucius replied, “Those 
who are true in my village conduct themselves differently. A father covers 
for his son, and a son covers for his father. And being true lies in this.”83
This passage can serve to highlight many aspects of Confucianism. We see here 
that law is not promoted by Kongzi as the correct way to deal with the situation 
of stealing a sheep (though this is not to say it may not be required in a more 
serious situation). Those who consider the man who handed his own father 
over to the authorities as superior in moral virtue, understanding it as a selfless 
act in honor of the greater good, are mistaken. Obeying the law (particularly 
to earn the title of “virtuous”) is not as important as loving and caring for one’s 
79  The Analects of Confucius, 1:11/4:20, 74.
80 Ibid., 4:18, 93.
81 Tan, “Authoritative Master Kong,” 143.
82  The Analects of Confucius, 13:15, 166.
83 Ibid., 13:18, 167.
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family.84 To act in a way contrary to the natural love one feels for their family is 
not the behavior of a virtuous person.
However, this love towards one’s father cannot be displayed in simply cov-
ering up the crime and being complicit in it. This would also not be virtuous 
behavior. Bai explains that by “preserving the loving relationship and trust, one 
can then more effectively help him [the father] right his wrongs.”85 Helping the 
father to right his wrongs will be more beneficial to the father and to society 
at large. This will not be a specific response to the crime as a legal framework 
would likely produce. Situations are contextual and need to be approached 
with creativity. Kongzi says, “I do not have presuppositions as to what may and 
may not be done.”86 Sigurdsson explains that “With regard to li, a person who 
has successfully internalized the spirit of a certain ritualistic practice is capable 
of applying it spontaneously when responding to new circumstances by adapt-
ing its primary or initially ‘stylized’ movements to these very circumstances.”87
Another key aspect here is that it is possible for the son to be the more mor-
ally cultivated out of the two in the relationship between him and his father. 
Therefore, Confucianism is realistic about accepting the non-ideal reality 
that those who hold inferior positions in government can be more virtuous 
than those above. It is even the case that those who are not in the government 
can be more virtuous than those who are.
In cases where such exemplary rulership is lacking, Kongzi looks to the sage 
rulers of the past and seeks to recruit the young men of his time to adopt the 
li crafted by these exemplars. Through this they will become learned in the 
rituals and behaviors and instill themselves with great virtue and benevolence. 
They will be able to take more responsibilities and higher office in which they 
are able to benefit more people and to cultivate their virtue further still. Over 
time, when they reach the highest offices it is hoped that they will have true 
understanding of ren and li and the authority to be able to transform them and 
shape them to fit the changing reality and relationships between the people.
Sigurdsson argues that in early Confucianism, “In order to be truly success-
ful, the individual, after having matured, also needs to have developed and be 
able to apply critical and creative powers to facilitate the continuous adapta-
tion of tradition to the circumstances and direction of the incessantly evolving 
times.”88 Confucianism does not recommend dogmatic adherence to tradition. 
84  Bai, China, 39.
85 Ibid., 40.
86  The Analects of Confucius, 18:8, 216.
87 Sigurdsson, “Confucian Philosophy,” 31.
88 Ibid., 29.
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Sigurdsson points to two key passages to make this argument. In the Analects, 
Kongzi says, “Reviewing the old as a means of realizing the new – such a per-
son can be considered a teacher.”89 In the Zhongyong (another Confucian text), 
Kongzi warns that those who are “born into the present age and yet return to 
the ways of the past will cause themselves misfortune.”90
But it is not only the young who are cultivated this way. O’Dwyer recognizes 
that in classical Confucianism:
… Anyone who lives a reasonably full life will get his or her chance to 
acquire knowledge of, and act beneficently for, the good of others across 
different relationships. This point will hold for both men and for women 
in any kind of role in which they deliberate for the good of others, such 
as younger siblings or their children. An exemplary person or sage like 
Confucius or Mencius would stand out, however, in his cultivated abili-
ties as parent, scholar, teacher, or minister to realize the widest range of 
moral and material goods for others.91
O’Dwyer’s description highlights that a Confucian morality based on familial 
relations seeks to instill paternal behaviors towards others into the whole of 
society. This allows the people to cultivate themselves in the ways that will 
possibly allow them to become virtuous paternal rulers of the future. For most, 
even in the ideal society, moral cultivation would only amount to being a good 
family member, a non-disruptive member of the community and perhaps an 
agricultural contributor. However, the people make up the system and enact 
the rulers wishes, propagating and instilling the morality issued from above 
and willingly providing the labor that secures the material needs of the people. 
Kongzi says, “Just being filial to your parents and befriending your brothers is 
carrying out the work of government.”92
As O’Dwyer highlights, the li that are in use during the time of Kongzi give 
much more power to men than women. This is a continuation of the preced-
ing tradition and again can lead some to claim Confucianism as authoritar-
ian in forcing some into subservience whilst granting authority and power to 
others. As stated earlier, O’Dwyer leans towards this view. This is a problem 
for classical Confucianism, but it is also a misunderstanding of the philoso-
phy. Li can, and must, be reformed to reflect the changing nature of society 
89  The Analects of Confucius, 2:11, 78.
90  Zhongyong, § 28, quoted in Sigurdsson, “Confucian Philosophy,” 29.
91 O’Dwyer, “Epistemic Elitism,” 40.
92  The Analects of Confucius, 2:21, 80.
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and its role relations. It is only the underlying moral sentiments, the natural 
roots from which virtue grows, that are seen to be constant. As Shin explains, 
“Kongzi viewed government as a dynamic phenomenon dealing with the con-
stantly shifting relationships between the governor and the governed.”93 It is 
in a stable society that propagates continuance of tradition and a respect for 
what came before that people can learn to become virtuous and then go on to 
transform that tradition. Revolution that seeks to overthrow and destroy the 
past misunderstands the nature of progression. There is no final aim or hard 
culture that is to be achieved, it is an ongoing process constantly improved. 
As Sigurdsson argues: “While certainly foundational in some sense, tradition 
is understood as a path to be constantly forged rather than as a place to be 
discovered once and for all.”94 Confucian exemplary paternalism is an ongoing 
constantly evolving process that expressly engages those at the bottom, society 
as a whole, as active participants in the general improvement of society.
6 Conclusion
A definition of paternalism that focuses on the substitution of judgment instead 
of use of force allows for a fruitful exploration of Confucianism through the 
lens of paternalism. This focus draws out interesting aspects of Confucianism 
and helps us to understand the system of the cultivation of the people and 
its relationship to the rule of the exemplars. What we have called Confucian 
exemplary paternalism is seen to be non-authoritarian in a variety of ways and 
so can help to remove the inherent negative connotations of paternalism. It 
does not accept the force of law as a sustainable or necessary method for en-
couraging the people to act in ways that are to their benefit and the benefit of 
wider society. The authority of those who are superior is based on merit and 
does not demand unquestioning obedience. It relies on the people to become 
cultivated in order that they make better decisions for themselves without the 
state prescribing definitive ways to act in every situation. The system inher-
ently requires adaptation to new and changing circumstances and encourages 
innovation in governance.
We have explored different definitions and models of paternalism in this 
paper, but all are grounded on the idea that, at least sometimes, the majority of 
people are not able to act in their best interests through lack of knowledge or 
perhaps motivation. One of the most unique aspects of Confucian exemplary 
93  Shin, Confucianism and Democratization, 107.
94  Sigurdsson, “Confucian Philosophy,” 23.
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paternalism is that this principle does not lead simply to a hard dichotomy 
between rulers and ruled (or those who know better and those who do not). 
Instead, Confucianism seeks to rectify the problem of the people’s less than 
beneficial behaviors by giving them the knowledge and tools to cultivate them-
selves and others around them.
This creates a self-supporting system in which the exemplary paternal rul-
ers craft the li (that are based on the innate moral sentiments of the people) 
in order to give them the tools to cultivate themselves as paternal members of 
society, which in turn will produce the exemplary paternal rulers of the future. 
These leaders will then continue to evolve and perpetuate the system creating 
a new generation of paternal citizens. A child is still born lacking knowledge 
and virtue (unable to act in their own best interests) but is born into a soci-
ety in which the li will shape and mold them into a caring, virtuous member 
of society.
Our reading of Confucianism as a form of paternalism shares many similari-
ties with Joseph Chan’s reading of Confucianism as a model of “perfectionism.” 
Indeed, we agree with Chan’s ideas at several points in this paper. Chan defines 
perfectionism in its broadest sense as “the view that the state should promote 
valuable conceptions of the good life.”95 Our reading is in line with Chan who 
notes that within the ideal conception of Confucian perfectionism is included 
“governance by people who are virtuous and competent; moral edification by 
example and persuasion; rites as a method of socialization and governance; 
and benevolent rule to ensure material sufficiency for all people.”96 Like Chan, 
we also wish to stress that:
Effective governance based on benevolence is only one aspect of the 
Confucian ideal. Another is the moral development of the common peo-
ple, namely, that they should be encouraged to act virtuously in the spirit 
of harmony, righteousness, benevolence, and deference.97
However, Chan states that paternalism is not an appropriate term to apply to 
Confucianism due to the common association of paternalism with use of force 
and coercion. Chan states that:
95  Joseph Chan, “Legitimacy, Unanimity and Perfectionism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
28, no. 1 (2000): 5.
96  Chan, Confucian Perfectionism, 2.
97  Ibid., 11.
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Perfectionism in politics, however, does not necessarily carry this feature, 
and in fact many contemporary political perfectionists do not favor coer-
cion as a means to promote the good life.98
Clearly, this perspective directly conflicts with one of the main points of our 
paper, namely, to show that the definition of paternalism should be expanded 
to include its more subtle and softer forms. We see Chinese philosophy in gen-
eral, and Confucian philosophy in particular, as playing a crucial role in this 
endeavor. In fact, Chan himself shows the difficulty of maintaining an entirely 
non-paternalist reading of Confucianism when he refers elsewhere to the rel-
evance of paternalist thinking for understanding aspects of the Confucian 
hierarchy.99
Our work is in fact similar in goal to Chan who wishes to demonstrate 
that Confucianism being a form of perfectionism does not inherently entail 
authoritarianism, as seen in the quotation above. Another reason Chan sites 
for preferring perfectionism to the label of paternalism is that he rejects the 
common reading that within Confucianism “the principles governing political 
relationships are drawn from, or are the same as, the principles governing the 
relationships in the family.”100 Whilst Chan provides some interesting insights 
into the differences between the relationship of the ruler and the ruled and 
the father and son, which we do not have sufficient space to explore here, we 
would favor the more widely endorsed view that the morality of the Confucian 
state extends outwards from the model of the family. By retaining the idea of 
the continuation of the familial relations into the political realm, we are able 
to argue for and to elucidate the upward movement of Confucian paternalism 
and its relation to the political and social structure. This is because in an ideal 
Confucian society, moral cultivation is taking place at every social level from 
the most intimate setting of the family to the widest context of rulership. This 
is the multileveled structure of Confucian paternalism in which, ideally speak-
ing, all citizens are participants.
More simply put, Confucianism suggests that a good upbringing in a stable 
family life with positive role models, coupled with a good education, is condu-
cive to producing morally upstanding citizens who will be able to leave society 
a better place than they found it. This is a common notion in most societies. 
98  Ibid., 44.
99  Joseph Chan, “Exploring the Nonfamilial in Confucian Political Philosophy,” in The 
Politics of Effective Relations: East Asia and Beyond, eds. Hahm Chaihark and Daniel A. Bell 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 56/62.
100 Chan, “Exploring the Nonfamilial,” 55.
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However, Kongzi realizes the power of this idea and therefore creates a model 
of paternalism in which the primary duty of the government is to ensure the 
stability, continuation, evolution and improvement of this societal structure. 
Therefore, Confucian exemplary paternalism can give great insight into how 
paternalist methods of governance can be utilized in modern societies where 
paternalist methods of oversight are indeed common.
As li is an indispensable part of exemplary paternalism, we agree with 
Sigurdsson who argues that:
There are numerous interpersonal customs in various Western tradi-
tions that can be formulated and applied in a manner comparable to li. 
Their increased formalization and explicit ‘inculcation’ would, I suggest, 
have a beneficial impact on both individual and society as long as the 
critical and creative attitude that their mastery requires is not left out of 
the picture.101
To be clear, this is not to argue for the installation of a full model of Confucian 
exemplary paternalism. We have not dealt with the difficult issues that arise 
in such a concrete implementation, particularly what methods should be em-
ployed when discord between the rulers and people arise. This is a topic for 
further study. Here, we simply wish to show that Confucianism can offer valu-
able insight into debate surrounding paternalism.
Confucian exemplary paternalism is not so vulnerable to the critiques that 
other contemporary soft forms of paternalism are. Positive and liberal pater-
nalism can be charged on the grounds that their scope is limited and cannot 
provide answers to the more difficult questions of governance. This limitation 
is directly related to attempts in the models to avoid the use of state coercion. 
Confucianism is not open to this criticism as it is a system that is far reaching 
and is in many ways an overhaul of people’s way of life. It is not attempting 
to alter people’s decision making in only limited regards. It is a system of in-
culcating the people into a moral outlook that carries over into every event of 
decision making of the general populace. In fact, rather than being accused 
of being too limited in scope, an argument can be made that is even more 
totalitarian than its legalist counterpart. Whereas Legalism asks that you act 
in a certain way, Confucianism asks not just for physical obedience but also 
obedience of the heart and mind.102 We do not make that criticism here and 
101 Sigurdsson, “Confucian Philosophy,” 31.
102 Hans-Georg Moeller and Paul J. D’Ambrosio, Genuine Pretending: On the Philosophy of the 
Zhuangzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 47-48.
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much of what we have argued goes against this view (particularly in regards 
to obedience).
Confucian exemplary paternalism is not authoritarian. It seeks to align it-
self with the will of the people. Although not democratic, it seeks to be repre-
sentative of the natural moral inclinations of the people and to inspire these 
same sentiments. Unlike liberal paternalism, Confucianism is transparent in 
its methods. The people understand the government is asking the people to 
better themselves. Confucianism retains a deterrent against bad behaviors in 
the form of shame. It offers the rewards of virtue itself and a better life for the 
individual and society.
The differences between Confucian exemplary paternalism and contem-
porary models of soft paternalism mean that Confucianism has a lot to offer 
current debate regarding definitions. Its resilience in the face of criticisms that 
are levelled at soft models of paternalism mean that it can be relevant towards 
contemporary applications. Paternalism, in the Confucian model, is not a top-
down system of governance that stops the people from doing what they want 
but rather a training ground that allows the people to flourish.
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